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MARYLAND'S MECHANICS' LIEN LAW 
The Maryland General Assembly recently enacted a new 
mechanics' lien statute in response to a Maryland Court of 
Appeals decision which held that portions of the former 
mechanics' lien were incompatible with the due process 
clauses of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the 
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. The author 
discusses the defects in the old law noted by the court and 
the attempt to remedy those defects in the new law. 
On May 4, 1976, Governor Marvin Mandel signed emergency 
legislationl amending Maryland's mechanics' lien statute. The 
new law attempts to remedy defects in Maryland's former me-
chanics' lien statute noted by the Maryland Court of Appeals in 
Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing CO.2 In that case, 
decided on February 10, 1976, the court of appeals found portions 
of Maryland's mechanics' lien law "incompatible with the due proc-
ess clauses of Article 23 [of the Maryland Declaration of Rights] 
and the Fourteenth Amendment [to the U.S. Constitution]."3 
In reaching its decision in Barry, the court of appeals con-
sidered four recent Supreme Court decisions which dealt with the 
constitutionality of certain state statutory prejudgment creditor 
remedies under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. 
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,4 the Supreme Court 
overturned a Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment statute5 which 
permitted a creditor to garnish the wages of an alleged debtor in 
the interim before trial although the creditor had no prior interest 
in the wages. The court concluded that in the absence of extra-
ordinary circumstances justifying the procedure,6 the statute vio-
lated the fundamental principles of due process because it failed 
to provide for notice and a prior hearing.7 
1. Law of May 4, 1976, ch. 349, [1976] Laws of Md. 938 (codified at MD. ANN. 
CoDE, Real Prop. Art., §§ 9-101 to 9-113 (Supp. 1976». Introduced by Senators 
Levitan, Connell, Hoyer and Cade as Senate Bill 998, the measure repealed 
former MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., §§ 9-101 to 9-108, 9-111 and 9-113 
(1974), as amended, § 9-105(e) (Supp. 1975); enacted new §§ 9-101 to 9-110; 
and renumbered former §§ 9-109, 9-110 and 9-112 (1974), respectively, as §§ 
9-111, 9-112 and 9-113. 
2. 277 Md. 15,353 A.2d 222 (1976). 
3. ld. at 33,353 A.2d at 233. 
4. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). 
5. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 267.04(1), 267.07(1),267.18(2) (a) (1965). 
6. 395 U.S. at 339. 
7. ld. at 342. 
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In Fuentes v. Shevin,8 it was held that the prejudgment replevin 
statutes of Florida9 and PennsylvaniatO were not in keeping with 
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The statutes 
allowed a private party to obtain a prejudgment writ of replevin 
on ex parte application to a court clerk, without notice to the 
alleged debtor or a prior hearing, upon the posting of a bond in 
an amount double the value of the property to be seized.ll The 
Supreme Court announced in Fuentes that due process requires, 
except in extraordinary situations, notice and an opportunity for 
an adversary-type hearing before a person can be even temporarily 
deprived of any possessory interest in personalty.12 
In Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.p the Supreme Court upheld 
a Louisiana statute14 under which a state court ordered the seques-
tration of personal property purchased under an installment con-
tract and subject to a vendor's lien. The Louisiana statute pro-
vided for sequestration when one claimed the ownership or right 
to possession of property or an interest in property when it was 
within the power of the defendant to conceal, waste, remove or 
dispose of the property or revenues therefrom. A writ could be 
obtained on the creditor's ex parte application without notice to 
the debtor or an opportunity for a hearing, but it would issue only 
when the nature and amount of the claim and the grounds relied 
upon for issuance of the writ (existence of a debt, the lien, and a 
delinquency) clearly appeared from specific facts shown by a veri-
fied petition or affidavit. The writ would not issue merely on con-
clusory allegations of ownership or property rights. A judge, 
rather than a court functionary, determined the sufficiency of the 
averments, and the creditor was required to file a bond which would 
compensate the debtor for any damages he might suffer as a result 
of an improvident sequestration. The debtor received a citation 
notifying him of the writ, and the Louisiana statute entitled him 
to immediate dissolution of the sequestration unless the creditor 
proved the grounds upon which the writ was issued. If the creditor 
failed in his proof, the court ordered the property returned to the 
debtor and awarded damages, including attorney's fees. The debtor, 
even without moving to dissolve the writ, could regain possession 
by filing a bond to protect the creditor against interim damage to 
8. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
9. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.01, 78.07, 78.08, 78.10, 78.13 (Supp. 1972-73). 
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1821 (1967); PA. R. CN. P. Rules 1073(a)-(b), 1076, 
1077 (1972). 
11. 407 U.S. at 73-78. 
12. ld. at 80-87. 
13. 416 U.S. 600 (1974). 
14. LA. STAT. ANN. C. CIV. P. Art. 281-83, 325, 2373, 3501, 3504, 3506-08, 3510, 
3571,3574,3576 (1961). 
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the property.tII The Supreme Court pointed out that because the 
creditor, as seller and holder of a vendor's lien, had a prior interest 
in the personalty until the purchase price was paid in full, the 
statute did not allow sequestration of property belonging exclu-
sively to the debtor.16 The Supreme Court concluded that the 
Louisiana statutory procedure was sufficient to meet due process 
requirements and effected "a constitutional accommodation of the 
respective interests of buyer and seller."lT 
In North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,IB the Su-
preme Court overturned a Georgia statutel9 which authorized, with-
out notice or a hearing, prejudgment garnishment of a bank ac-
count. Under the Georgia law, the creditor merely had to (1) 
execute an affidavit before an officer or court clerk authorized to 
issue an attachment stating the amount claimed to be due and that 
he had reason to apprehend the loss of all or some of the debt unless 
the writ was issued and (2) file a bond equal to twice the amount 
claimed. The debtor could dissolve the garnishment by filing a 
bond.20 The Supreme Court found the Georgia statute violative of 
due process because it allowed the impoundment of property "by a 
writ of garnishment issued by a court clerk without notice or 
opportunity for an early hearing and without participation by a 
judicial officer."21 The Court noted that, unlike the Louisiana 
statute in question in Mitchell, the Georgia law 
[had] none of the saving characteristics of the Louisiana 
statute. The writ of garnishment is issuable on the affidavit 
of the creditor or his attorney, and the latter need not have 
personal knowledge of the facts. The affidavit .•• need 
contain only conclusory allegations. The writ is issuable 
..• by the court clerk, without participation by a judge. 
Upon service of the writ, the debtor is deprived of the use 
of the property in the hands of the garnishee .... There is 
no provision for an early hearing at which the creditor 
would be required to demonstrate at least probable cause 
for the garnishment.22 
Maryland's former mechanics' lien law provided: 
Every building erected and every building repaired, rebuilt, 
or improved, to the extent of one fourth of its value, is 
subject to a lien for the payment of all debts without regard 
15. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 605-07 (1974). 
16. ld. at 604. 
17. ld. at 610. 
18. 419 U.S. 601 (1975). 
19. GA. CoDE tit. 46-101 to -04 (1972). 
20. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 602-03 (1975). 
21. ld. at 606. 
22. ld. at 607. 
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to the amount contracted for work done for or about the 
building, and for materials furnished for or about the 
building, including the drilling and installation of wells 
for the purpose of supplying water, the construction or in-
stallation of any swimming pool, the sodding, seeding or 
planting in or about the premises of any shrubs, trees, 
plants, flowers, or nursery products of any kind or descrip-
tion and the grading, filling, landscaping, and paving of 
the premises.23 
The lien also attached to "the land covered by the building and 
to as much other land, immediately adjacent and belonging in 
like manner to the owner of the building, as may be necessary for 
the ordinary and useful purposes of the building."24 
Under this statute, the lien was created and attached to the 
property as soon as work was performed or materials were sup-
plied.25 The lien existed for 180 days after the work was finished 
or the materials furnished. Although it was not necessary to file 
a claim to establish the lien, the claimant had to file a claim 
within the 180 day period with the clerk of the circuit court of 
the county in order to retain it.26 The clerk would record the 
claim in a Mechanics' Lien Docket.27 The lien existed for one 
year from the date of filing unless the claimant commenced pro-
ceedings to enforce it or the property owner brought proceedings 
to compel the claimant to prove the validity of the lien.28 The 
lien was enforceable by foreclosure on the property.29 Under the 
former law, no notice to the property owner was required until a 
suit was commenced to enforce the claim, at which time all in-
terested parties were entitled to notice as in other equity actions.so 
When the claimant was a subcontractor under a contract with a 
person other than the owner of the land, the statute required that 
he provide the owner with notice in writing of his intention to 
claim a lien within ninety days of furnishing the work or materiaPl 
23. Law of July 1, 1974, ch. 12, § 9-101 (a), [1974] Laws of Md. 356-57 (repealed 
1976). 
24. [d. § 9-102(a), at 357. Under the old and new mechanics' lien laws, any machine, 
wharf or bridge erected, constructed or repaired within the state may also be 
subject to a mechanic's lien. [d. § 9-111, at 363; MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., 
§ 9-102(b) (Supp. 1976). 
25. Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 277 Md. 15, 19, 353 A.2d 222, 
225-26 (1976); Law of July 1, 1974, ch. 12, §§ 9-101 (a), 9-105(e), [1974] Laws 
of Md. 356-57, 360 (repealed 1976). 
26. Law of July 1,1974, ch. 12, § 9-105(e), [1974] Laws of Md. 360 (repealed 1976). 
27. [d. § 9-105(b), at 359-60. 
28. [d. § 9-106, at 361. 
29. Md. Rule BG 73 (1975). 
30. See Grinnell Co. v. City of Crisfield, 264 Md. 552, 287 A.2d 486 (1972). 
31. Law of July 1, 1974, ch. 12, § 9-103(a), [1974] Laws of Md. 358 (repealed 
1976); Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 277 Md. 15, 30, 353 
A.2d 222, 231 (1976). 
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The subcontractor could, however, file his claim with the clerk of 
the court before he gave the notice of intent to claim a lien.32 
The Maryland Court of Appeals held in Barry that the former 
mechanics' lien law violated due process because it allowed pre-
judgment seizures without notice, a prior hearing, or other suffi-
cient safeguards.s3 The court stated that, in light of Sniadach, 
Fuentes, Mitchell, and North Georgia Finishing, Inc., 
[1] acking extraordinary circumstances, statutory prejudg-
ment creditor remedies which even temporarily deprive a 
debtor of a significant property interest without notice and 
an opportunity for a probable-cause-type hearing are ... 
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment's due 
process clause unless safeguards such as those mentioned 
in Mitchell and North Georgia Finishing are present and 
even then ... the law may be invalid if the issues under-
lying the seizure are not susceptible to uncomplicated docu-
mentary proof or if the creditor does not have a present 
interest in the property seized.34 
The court found that the filing of a lien claim, although it was 
recorded, did not give the property owner constructive notice of 
the lien and that the subcontractor's notice of intent to claim a 
lien was inadequate. The court held that under the former statute 
there could be "no existing lien on property until and unless the 
claimant prevails either in a suit to enforce the claimed lien or in 
some other appropriate proceeding providing notice and a hear-
ing .... "35 The court also determined that former § 9-107 (b) ,36 
"to the extent that it grants mechanics' liens 'priority over any 
mortgage, judgment, lien or encumbrance attaching to the building 
or ground subsequent to the commencement of the building' but 
prior to the time the lien is established by a judicial determination, 
is also null and void •... "37 
The defective portions of the law were found to be severable. 
The court decided that the remainder of the statute could stand 
"by excising that portion of the statute which purport [ed] to 
create a lien from the time work [was] performed or materials 
32. Accrocco v. Fort Washington Lumber Co., 255 Md. 682, 684, 259 A.2d 60, 61 
(1969). 
33. 277 Md. at 33, 353 A2d at 233. 
34. ld. at 30, 353 A.2d at 231. 
35. ld. at 37, 353 A.2d at 235. The court then held, to the amazement of dissenting 
Judge L. Levine, that the appellant was not deprived of its property without due 
process and upheld the mechanics' lien on the property. ld. at 38, 353 A.2d at 237. 
See id. at 39-41, 353 A.2d at 236-37 (Levine, J., dissenting). See also Caplan 
Bros., Inc. v. Village of Cross Keys, Inc., 277 Mel. 41, 353 A2d 239 (1976). 
36. Law of July 1, 1974, ch. 12, § 9-107(b), [1974] Laws of Md. 361-62 (repealed 
1976). 
37. 277 Md. at 37, 353 A.2d at 235. 
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furnished to the time a lien [was] established by judicial deter-
mination in a proceeding sufficient with respect to due process."3S 
The court did not suggest that the legislature was prohibited from 
enacting a mechanics' lien law permitting general contractors and 
subcontractors to obtain liens prior to owners being given notice 
and a hearing, if the statute included safeguards such as those 
enumerated in Mitchell and North Georgia Finishing.39 
Under Maryland's new mechanics' lien law, a lien does not 
automatically attach as soon as work is performed or materials 
are furnished; instead, "[ e] very building erected and every build-
ing repaired, rebuilt, or improved to the extent of 25 percent of its 
value is subject to establishment of a lien .... "40 
In order to establish a lien under the new mechanics' lien law, 
a person claiming a lien must institute proceedings in the circuit 
court for the county where the land or any part of the land is 
located within 180 days after the work is finished or materials 
furnished.41 The proceedings are commenced by filing a petition 
in equity with the clerk of the court setting forth the following: 
(i) The name and address of the petitioner; 
(ii) The name and address of the owner; 
(iii) The nature or kind of work done or the kind and 
amount of materials furnished, the time when the work 
was done or the materials furnished, the name of the person 
for whom the work was done or to whom the materials 
were furnished and the amount or sum claimed to be due, 
less any credit recognized by the petitioner; 
(iv) A description of the land, including a statement 
whether part of the land is located in another county, and 
a description adequate to identify the building .... 42 
An affidavit must also be filed setting forth the facts upon which 
the petitioner claims he is entitled to a lien in the amount specified. 
Original or sworn, certified or photostatic copies of all material 
papers which constitute the basis of the claim must also be filed 
unless their absence is explained in the affidavit.4s 
If the petitioner is a subcontractor, he is not entitled to a lien 
unless, within ninety days after doing the work or furnishing the 
materials, he gives notice to the owner in writing of his intention 
38. [d. 
39. [d., n.12. 
40. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 9-l02(a) (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added). 
41. [d. § 9-105 (a). 
42. [d. § 9-105 (a) (1) (i)-(iv). 
43. [d. § 9-105 (a) (2)-(3). 
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to claim a lien.44 The new law directs that the notice be substantially 
in the following form: 
Notice to Owner or Owner's Agent of Intention to Claim 
a Lien 
Subcontractor 
did work or furnished material for or about the building 
generally designated or briefly described as ------
-------------------------------------------,. 
The total amount earned under the subcontractor's under-
taking to the date hereof is $ of which $,----
is due and unpaid as of the date hereof. The work done or 
materials provided under the subcontract were as follows: 
(insert brief description of the work done and materials 
furnished, the time when the work was done or the ma-
terials furnished, and the name of the person for whom 
the work was done or to whom the materials were fur-
nished) . 
I do solemnly declare and affirm under the penalties of 
perjury that the contents of the foregoing notice are true 
to the best of the affiant's knowledge,· information and 
belief. 
on behalf of 
(Individual) 
(Subcontractor) 
(Insert if subcontractor 
is not an individual) 45 
To be effective, the notice must be given by registered or certi-
ned mail, return receipt requested, or personally delivered to the 
owner by the claimant or his agent.46 If notice cannot be given 
.due to absence of the owner or other causes, the subcontractor, or 
his agent, in the presence of a competent witness and within 90 
.days, may place the notice on the door or other front part of the 
building.47 Facts showing that notice of intent to claim a lien was 
properly mailed or served upon the owner, or if so authorized, 
posted, must be set forth in the petition.48 
44. ld. § 9-104(a). 
45. ld. § 9-104(b). 
46. ld. § 9-104(c). 
47. ld. § 9-104(e). Notice by posting is sufficient in all cases where the owner of the 
property has died and his successors in title do not appear on the public records 
of the county. ld. 
48. ld. § 9-105 (a)(l)(v). 
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After the petition to establish a mechanics' lien is filed by a 
general contractor or subcontractor, the court reviews the plead-
ings and documents on file and may require the petitioner to sup-
plement or explain any matters contained in them. If the court 
determines from the pleadings, documents and any supplements 
and explanations that a lien should attach, the court issues an order 
directing the owner, within fifteen days from the date of service 
of copies of the order, pleadings and documents on file, to show 
cause why a lien upon the property and for the amount claimed 
should not attach.49 The order informs the owner that he may 
appear at the time stated in the order and present evidence in his 
behalf or file a counteraffidavit at or before that time, and that if 
he does not appear or file a counteraffidavit, the facts in the peti-
tioner's claim are deemed admitted and a lien attaches to the prop-
erty.50 If the owner desires to controvert any facts in the peti-
tioner's claim he must file an affidavit in support of his answer 
showing cause. Failure to file such affidavit constitutes an admis-
sion of the facts in petitioner's affidavit but not an admission that 
his petition or affidavit is legally sufficient.51 If the owner's answer 
shows cause why a lien in the amount claimed should not be estab-
lished, the matter is set down for a hearing at the "earliest possible 
time."52 
If the pleadings, affidavits, admissions on file, and the evidence 
show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 
that the lien should attach as a matter of law, a final order is 
entered establishing the lien. 53 If it is shown that there is no gen-
uine dispute as to any material fact and that the petitioner has 
failed to establish his right to a lien as a matter of law, then a 
final order is entered denying the lien. 54 However, if the court 
determines that the lien as a matter of law should not attach or 
should not attach in the amount claimed, but that there is probable 
cause to believe that the petitioner is entitled to a lien, the court 
enters an interlocutory order which: 
(I) Establishes the lien; 
(II) Describes the boundaries of the land and the build-
ings to which the lien attaches; 
49. [d. § 9-106 (a) (1). 
50. [d. § 9-106 (a)(l) (i)(ii). See Md. Rule BG 73 (1976). 
51. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 9-106 (a) (2). 
52. [d. § 9-106 (a) (3). 
53. [d. § 9-106(b) (I). If it appears that there is no genuine dispute as to a portion 
of the claim, then a lien will be established with respect to that portion and the 
action will proceed on the disputed amount. [d. 
54. [d. § 9-106(b) (2). 
1976] Recent Legislation 
(III) States the amount of the claim for which probable 
cause is found; 
(IV) Specifies the amount of a bond that the owner may 
file to have the land and building released from the lien; 
(V) May require the claimant to file a bond in an 
amount that the court believes sufficient for damages, in-
cluding reasonable attorney's fees; 
(VI) Assigns a date for the trial of all the matters at 
issue in the action, which shall be within a period of six 
months.55 
189 
The owner or any other person who is interested in the property 
may at any time move to have the lien established by the inter-
locutory order modified or dissolved or apply to the court for an 
order requiring an additional bond. 56 
The right to enforce any lien established lasts for one year 
from the day the petition to establish the lien was first filed. 
Petitioner may either file a petition to enforce the lien or execute 
on any bond given to obtain a release from the lien.57 
For purposes of priority, the former mechanics' lien statute 
differentiated between mechanics' liens58 and other liens.59 A me-
chanics' lien was given priority over "any mortgage, judgment, 
lien or encumbrance attaching to the building or ground subsequent 
to the commencement of the building."60 However, a mortgage, 
judgment, lien or encumbrance that attached prior to the com-
mencement of the building had priority over a mechanics' lien 
subsequently attaching if the mortgage, judgment, lien or encum-
brance was required to be recorded and had been recorded prior 
to the commencement of the building.61 
The new statute provides that if property against which a 
mechanics' lien has been established is sold under foreclosure or 
a judgment, execution or any other court order, all liens and 
encumbrances on the property are to be "satisfied in accordance 
with their priority."62 Since under the new law a mechanics' lien 
is no longer created and attached when work is performed or 
materials furnished, but rather only upon a judicial determination, 
a mechanics' lien no longer has automatic priority over all mort-
gages, judgments, liens or encumbrances that attached subsequent 
55. Id. § 9-106(b) (3) (i)-(vi). 
56. Id. § 9-106(b) (3) (vi). 
57. Id. § 9-109. 




62. MD. ANI>. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 9-108 (Supp. 1976). 
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to commencement of the building; instead, its priority is deter-
mined by the general rules of law governing priorities. 
The former law dealt with priorities among mechanics' liens 
in the following vague manner: 
If the proceeds of any building and ground are not sufficient 
to pay the full amount of all debts due as provided in this 
title for work done and material furnished, after deducting 
from the proceeds any prior lien on it, then the debts shall 
be paid in proportion to their respective amounts.63 
The new law places a limitation on the rule that all liens and 
encumbrances are to be "satisfied in accordance with their priority" 
as far as competing mechanics' liens are concerned. 
If the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to satisfy all liens 
established pursuant to this subtitle, then all proceeds avail-
able to satisfy each such lien shall be stated by the court 
auditor as one fund, and the amount to be disbursed to 
satisfy each lien established pursuant to this subtitle shall 
bear the same proportion to that fund as the amount of 
such lien bears to the total amount secured by all such liens, 
without regard to priority among such liens.64 
Prior to the new statute, property could be sold from under 
the bona fide purchaser for value in order to satisfy a mechanics' 
lien which attached automatically as soon as work was performed 
or materials delivered, but which had not yet been recorded among 
the land records when the BFP bought the property.Gu The new 
law provides that a "building or the land on which the building is 
erected may not be subjected to a lien ... if, prior to the estab-
lishment of a lien . . . legal title has been granted to a bona fide 
purchaser for value."GG Once legal title to the property has passed 
to a BFP for value, a builder, subcontractor, materialman or the 
like cannot establish a lien against the property. 
On JUly 12, 1976, the Maryland Court of Appeals issued an 
emergency order, to take effect on August 9, 1976, adopting changes 
in Subtitle BGG7 (Mechanics' Lien - Enforcement) of the Mary-
land Rules of Procedure to bring them into conformity with the 
new mechanics' lien legislation.GS 
63. Law of July 1, 1974, ch. 12, § 9-107(a) , [1974] Laws of Md. 361 (repealed 1976). 
64. :MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 9-108 (Supp. 1976). 
65. Sec Clark Certified Concrete Co. v. Lindberg, 216 Md. 576, 141 A.2d 645 (1958). 
66. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 9-102(c) (Supp.1976). 
67. Md. Rules BG 70-76 (1975). 
68. :Md. Rules BG 70-77 (1976); 3 Md. Reg. 16, Aug. 4, 1976 at 839-45. 
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Rule BG 70 (Definitions), which formerly defined only "me-
chanics' lien,"G9 was amended by adding certain key definitions: 
contract, contractor, land, owner and subcontractor.'o 
The court of appeals amended Rule BG 71 (Commencement 
of Action) 71 by deleting the provisions for the enforcement of a 
mechanics' lien, and substituting provisions for the filing of a peti-
tion to establish a mechanics' lien.72 
Rule BG 72 (Amendment) now prohibits amendments which 
increase the amount of a claim or materially alter the description 
of the land after the expiration of the period within which notice 
of a lien claim must be given, or if notice is not required, after the 
period within which the petition to establish the lien must be filed.'3 
Former Rule BG 73 (Sale) was rescinded.74 New Rule BG 73 
(Proceedings) states that if the court determines from the petition 
filed and from any supplements and explanations that there is 
reasonable ground for the lien to attach, the court shall order the 
defendant to show cause within fifteen days from date of service 
of copies of the order, the pleadings and documents on file, why a 
lien should not attach. The rule further provides for an affidavit or 
a verified answer to a show cause order and for a hearing. The 
hearing procedure is similar to the procedure for a hearing on a 
motion for summary judgment. If no final or interlocutory order 
is granted upon a hearing, the rule requires that a final order be 
entered dismissing the petition for a lien75 unless petitioner files 
a written request within thirty days for a trial. 
New Rule BG 74 (Enforcement of Lien)76 expands the pro-
visions of former Rule BG 71 (Commencement of Action)77 and 
former Rule BG 73 (Sale)78 for the enforcement of a mechanics' 
lien by stating that the petitioner cannot enforce a lien and cannot 
execute on a bond given to obtain a release of the lien until the 
lien is established by a final order. In order to enforce the lien or 
to execute on the bond the petitioner must file a petition in the 
original proceedings within one year after the date on which the 
petition to establish the lien was filed. It may be included in the 
69. Md. Rule BG 70 (1975). 
70. Md. Rule BG 70 (1976). 
71. 1-Id. Rule BG 71 (1975). 
72. "Md. Rule BG 71 (1976). 
73. Md. Rule BG 72 (1976). The rule formerly used the language "after the expira-
tion of the period within which notice must be given or the lien must be re-
corded if notice is not required . . ." and used the word "land" instead of 
"property". l\·Id. Rule BG 72 (1975). 
74. Md. Rule BG 73 (1975). 
75. Md .. Rule BG 73 (1976). 
76. Md. Rule BG 74 (1976). 
77. Md. Rule BG 71 (1975). 
78. Md. Rule BG 73 (1975). 
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original petition to establish the lien.79 Subtitle BR (Sales -
Judicial) governs the conduct of the sale.so 
Rule BG 74 (Payment of Mechanics' Lien Claim - Sale Under 
Other Lien Court Order) 81 is redesignated as Rule BG 75 (Referral 
to Auditor) which provides only that after a sale, the proceeding 
shall be referred by the court to an auditor for the purpose of 
stating an account.82 
Former Rule BG 75 (Release of Lien) 83 was redesignated and 
amended as Rule BG 76 (Release of Lien) which provides that at 
any time after a petition to establish a lien is filed, the owner 
of land or any person interested therein may file a petition to have 
the land released from a mechanics' lien or from a lien which may 
thereafter be established. The court shall enter an order releasing 
the land from the lien upon the filing of a bond approved by the 
court.84 
New Rule BG 77 (Designation of Boundaries) ,85 formerly Rule 
BG 76,8(\ provides that an owner may file a notice to establish bound-
aries before commencement of construction of any improvements 
to property which might become the subject of a claim for a 
mechanics' lien. The owner must file the notice in an ex 1JaTte 
proceeding in an equity court of the county in which the property 
is located. The provisions of the old rule for designation of bound-
aries after construction has commenced are retained, but if the 
petitioner is already a party to a proceeding to establish a lien, 
the petition to designate boundaries must be filed in the proceeding 
instituted to establish a lien.87 
79. Md. Rule BG 74 (1976). 
80. See lI,'Id. Rules BR 1--6. 
81. Md. Rule BG 74 (1975). 
82. "Md. Rule BG 75 (1976) .. 
83. Md. Rule BG 75 (1975). 
84. Md. Rule BG 76 (1976). 
85. Md. Rule BG 77 (1976). 
86. Md. Rule BG 76 (1975). 
87. Md. Rule BG 77 (1976). The notice must contain: 
(i) a reference to the conveyance or other means by which the owner 
acquired title to the land; 
(ii) a description of the newly established boundaries sufficient to iden-
tify the land with reasonable certainty; and 
(iii) a brief description of the construction for which the boundaries 
are established. 
[d. The notice is captioned, filed and indexed as in any other proceeding in 
equity under the owner's name. [d. 
1976] 
CONCLUSION 
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The new statute and rules provide for establishment of a me-
chanics' lien by judicial determination. An action to establish a 
mechanics' lien against property is commenced by filing a petition 
to establish a lien. The owner is then summoned and given an 
opportunity to show cause why the lien should not be established. 
A lien may be established or denied on a summary basis or after 
a hearing and trial, but it does not attach until issuance of a final 
court order. 
The mechanics' lien statute was originally enacted to encourage 
construction by ensuring that those who contributed work or ma-
terials to the construction of a project would be compensated.88 
The law is particularly important to the subcontractor who is not 
in privity with the owner and cannot sue him in contract. If the 
party with whom he contracted is insolvenl or vanishes the sub-
contractor has a remedy against the property.1ID 
Under the new law, the owner may alienate or encumber the 
property after work is provided or materials furnished but before 
a mechanics' lien has been established. Recovery under the new 
mechanics' lien law is determined according to general rules of 
priority and it is possible that the claimant will not recover at all 
or will recover less than his claim. 
The new law may appear to circumvent the original legislative 
intent to favor the contractor and subcontractor by favoring the 
owner of property, especially the BFP for value. Yet the new law 
is more fair and balanced than the old, which was weighted heavily 
against the property owner. It provides notice to the owner and 
an opportunity for a hearing and yet continues to provide security 
for those who have contributed work or materials to the con-
struction of a project. 
The Maryland Legislature is to be commended for responding 
so quickly to repair the defects in the old mechanics' lien statute 
pointed out by the court of appeals in Barry. The new· law was 
enacted just eighty-four days after the court of appeals handed 
down its decision. 
Gerald L. Everett 
88. Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co .• m Md. 15, 36, 353 A.2d 222, 
234 (1976). 
89. See Port City Constr; Co. v. Adams & Douglass, Inc., 260 Md. 585, 273 A.2d 
121 (1971). 
